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Abstract  
In recent years, we developed a modeling framework for process-related security properties, the 
BusinessActivities Framework. This paper reports on a long-term empirical study to evaluate the 
applicability of four UML extensions included in the BusinessActivities Framework. We used an 
exploratory research design employing four interpretative case studies followed by three semi-
structured interviews based on 30 real-world business processes from a large Austrian school center. 
The case work resulted in 23 process models. By assessing the model complexity quantitatively and by 
interpreting the case as well as the interview material, we found that modelers are predominantly 
affected by the upfront effort of establishing a conceptual background on process-related security 
concepts and by the semantic complexity of control-flow modeling in UML activity diagrams. Non-
technical domain experts considered the visual process models as suitable communication 
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1 Introduction 
Business processes specify how an organization's resources are used to achieve certain predefined 
business goals. Consequently, their correct execution is of major importance for the respective 
organizations. Although the information systems that support the execution of business processes are 
exposed to various kinds of security threats, process models, information systems, and corresponding 
security policies are usually defined separately (see, e.g., zur Muehlen et al., 2008). However, to 
enable the secure execution of business processes and to enforce security policies in information 
systems, process-related security aspects must be already considered in the early stages of business 
process design and throughout the entire software development lifecycle (see, e.g., Mouratidis and 
Jürjens, 2010).  
In this context, we developed the BusinessActivities Framework that aims at supporting the 
specification, the implementation, and the enforcement of process-related security properties at 
various stages of the security-engineering process (see Section 2). The BusinessActivities Framework 
includes computation-independent models (CIM) for process-related security properties as well as 
corresponding platform independent (PIM) and platform-specific models (PSM). At the PIM level, we 
provide a number of UML extensions that extend the UML (OMG, 2011) with modeling primitives for 
process-related security properties. Our research on the BusinessActivities Framework follows a 
design science research approach (see, e.g., Hevner et al., 2004; Peffers et al., 2007). For this reason, 
our research includes the collection of empirical observations to establish how our design artifacts 
(i.e., the tooling and the corresponding engineering methods) can be improved (cf. Hevner et al., 
2004).  
In this paper, we focus on the evaluation of UML extensions which allow the integrated modeling of 
business processes and related Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) concepts. In recent years, RBAC 
(see, e.g., Ferraiolo et al., 2007) has developed into a de facto standard for access control. In RBAC, 
roles are used to model different job positions and responsibilities within an organization and/or 
information system. Permissions are assigned to roles according to the tasks each role has to 
accomplish. The roles are then assigned to human users according to their respective work profile. 
Roles are also used as an abstract concept for delegation (see, e.g., Crampton and Khambhammettu, 
2008) or for the assignment of duties defined via obligations (see, e.g., Zhao et al., 2007). The need for 
integrated modeling of business processes and related access control concepts has been repeatedly 
identified in research and practice (see, e.g., List and Korherr, 2006).  
Currently, empirical evidence (e.g., well-documented industrial case studies) on the suitability of 
model-driven security engineering artifacts is largely missing. Many related reports are based on 
small, fictitious examples for explaining certain approaches or concepts. Moreover, most often the 
related work does not provide a detailed description of the respective research process (see Section 5). 
Thus, to evaluate our modeling artifacts we first had to establish which factors actually contribute to 
the applicability of our model-driven engineering framework. In this paper, we describe a qualitative 
multi-method study to evaluate four of the UML extensions that are part of the BusinessActivities 
Framework. In particular, we conducted a series of case studies and interviews. The case studies are 
based on a collection of real-world business processes provided by a large Austrian school center. The 
interviews were conducted subsequent to the case studies to further evaluate the modeling artifacts 
produced during the case studies. The whole research process reported in this paper took about one 
year. In this period of time, the case studies (60 working days) and the interviews were conducted. Our 
evaluation was guided by the following two exploratory research questions: 
RQ1: Which are the barriers to adopting our UML extensions by domain modelers having a basic 
background in UML activity modeling? 
RQ2: Which are the barriers to using the process models based on our UML extensions for non-
technical, non-security stakeholders in modeled organizations? 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the research object of 
our qualitative research: the UML extensions included in the BusinessActivities Framework. 
Subsequently, Section 3 details our multi-method research design as well as the data 
collection/analysis of our case studies and semi-structured interviews, respectively. Section 4 
discusses the observations from the study and reviews these observations in the light of the two 
guiding research questions. In Section 5, we elaborate on the limitations of our approach and of the 
resulting findings. Section 6, presents related work and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2 Overview of the UML Extensions for BusinessActivities 
In this section, we shortly summarize the modeling artifacts evaluated in this paper. In (Strembeck and 
Mendling, 2011), we present an integrated approach for modeling processes and process-related 
RBAC models. Based on a formal metamodel (at the CIM level) for process-related RBAC models, 
we define a domain-specific extension for UML activity diagrams (at the PIM level). In addition, the 
BusinessActivites framework includes extensions for several other RBAC-related security properties. 
In this paper, we evaluate four of these extensions:  
(1) The Duty extension (Schefer and Strembeck, 2011a, Schefer, 2011) enables the integrated 
modeling of duties defined in obligation policies and process-related RBAC models. Thereby, we 
support process modelers when defining tasks, which require the fulfilment of certain duties when 
these tasks are executed in order to comply with certain laws and regulations.  
(2) The Delegation extension (Schefer and Strembeck, 2011b) provides modeling support for the 
delegation of roles, tasks, and duties in the context of process-related RBAC models. Delegation is an 
important concept to increase flexibility in authorization and obligation management. However, due to 
the complex interplay of delegation assignments with other process- and RBAC-related concepts, we 
propose explicit delegation abstractions for integrated RBAC process models.  
(3) The Context Constraint extension (Schefer-Wenzl and Strembeck, 2012a) enables the definition of 
context-aware RBAC models for business processes. In an IT-supported workflow, process-related 
context constraints can be defined as means to consider context information in access-control 
decisions. A context constraint specifies that certain conditions must be fulfilled to permit the 
execution of a particular task.  
(4) The Break-Glass extension (Schefer-Wenzl and Strembeck, 2012b) supports the modeling of 
process-related break-glass policies. In emergency situations, certain subjects sometimes have to 
perform important tasks although they are usually not authorized to perform these tasks. Break-glass 
policies have been introduced as a sophisticated exception handling mechanism to resolve such 
situations. They enable selected subjects to break or override the standard access control policies of an 
information system in a controlled manner. 
Figure 1a shows a simplified medical examination process modeled as a UML BusinessActivity. The 
example process uses some of the new modeling elements introduced in the  BusinessActivity 
extension (Strembeck and Mendling, 2011). The process from Figure 1a starts when a patient arrives 
at the hospital. The process includes four so-called BusinessActions. BusinessActions are special 
purpose tasks that can be linked to, e.g., roles and constraints. A BusinessAction is depicted as a 
UML2 Action symbol (a round-cornered rectangle) that includes the letter “B” in a compartment in 
the upper right corner. The process from Figure 1a also visualizes task-based entailment constraints, 
which place some restriction on the subjects who are allowed (or required) to execute a particular task. 
For example, a subject-binding constraint defines that two bound tasks must be performed by the same 
individual within the same process instance. In the example process from Figure 1a, a subject-binding 
constraint is defined between the tasks t1 and t2 to ensure that the same physician who performed the 
examination in the "Medical examination" task also evaluates appropriate medical treatment options. 
This subject binding is indicated via "SBind" entries in the corresponding task symbol. Figure 1b 
illustrates corresponding task-to-role, role-to-subject, and role-to-role assignments. For example, 
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subject S1 is assigned to the Junior Physician role. All members of the Junior Physician role are 




Figure 1. Simplified medical examination process 
 
3 Research Design 
The two guiding research questions (RQ1, RQ2) established different requirements on our research 
design. First, each research question targets a distinct group of subjects: domain modelers (technical 
experts) applying the UML extensions as well as non-technical domain experts using the resulting 
diagrams, respectively. Second, as RQ1 was to be explored in a real-world modeling situation, a 
substantial upfront effort was required to complete a set of non-trivial modeling tasks to produce 
models which are then to be evaluated with regard to RQ2. Addressing both research questions in a 
single research step was therefore discarded. Third, the modeling artifacts resulting from investigating 
RQ1 would be available to extract basic quantitative data about certain internal attributes of the 
extended UML models (e.g., model sizes and structuredness). This quantitative data would allow for 
contextualizing observations with respect to RQ1 and RQ2, for instance, by reflecting on the model 
complexity.  
 
Figure 2.  A multi-method research design 
Therefore, we adopted a sequential multi-method research design (see Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010) 
with two subsequent research phases and two different research instruments (see Figure 2). As for 
RQ1, we designed interpretative case studies (see Klein and Myers, 1999) because we wanted to 
address RQ1 using non-trivial process engineering tasks. RQ2 would then be covered by subsequent 
semi-structured interviews (see Hove and Anda, 2005) which would allow us to collect data 
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concerning the communicability as perceived by important stakeholders. In addition, the interviews 
would permit clarifying critical model details for the respondents to improve the quality of the 
answers. 
3.1 Case Study Design 
To address the first research question (RQ1), we designed a series of case studies, with each case 
study focusing on one particular UML extension (see Section 2) in isolation. In the following, we 
summarize the case study objective, the real-world setting to be studied (the case), the frame of 
conceptual reference (theory), and the details of data collection (methods; see Robson, 2011; Runeson 
and Höst, 2009): 
 
Case selection: The case setting was provided by a large Austrian school center offering different 
education levels ranging from elementary to advanced levels. The primary case artifacts were the 
textual descriptions of about 30 organizational processes collected by members of the school during a 
process management initiative. The control flow of some processes was graphically visualized 
depicting the sequence of tasks as well as of corresponding authorized and responsible persons. 
However, these processes were visualized using an ad hoc graphical notation. Furthermore, most of 
the processes were described in a detailed textual/tabular listing of activities with varying levels of 
granularity. These process descriptions included references to legal requirements (e.g., paragraphs in 
the Austrian law concerning teaching in schools) as well as to other internal or external regulatory 
documents (e.g., recommendations and guidelines of the Austrian Department of Education). In many 
organizations, such data are usually confidential. The school center, however, offered us detailed 
process descriptions including additional information on authorized and responsible persons for each 
task. At the same time, the school center allowed us to publish our results in anonymized form. 
Moreover, administrative and faculty members of the school were available to collect further 
feedback. In each case study, a subset of these processes was modeled by applying one of our UML 
extensions.  
Objective: The case studies were designed to identify possible barriers that users of our extensions 
might experience. The practical objective was to construct a collection of extended UML activities to 
visualize organizational processes in the above case. The references to and process details extracted 
from the regulatory documents were to be translated into explicit model elements that are provided by 
our UML extensions. 
Conceptual framing: In Strembeck and Mendling (2011), we provide the key vocabulary and the 
abstracted concepts to consider RBAC engineering artifacts (roles, tasks, subject-role assignments, 
etc.) in a business process context (see Section 2). This includes a formal metamodel for integrating 
RBAC artifacts into business processes. Each case study was designed to cover one particular UML 
extension.  
Methods: The first case study evaluates the Break-Glass extension presented in Schefer-Wenzl and 
Strembeck (2012b) and was performed by the authors of this paper for pre-test purposes. We tested the 
whole data collection and data analysis process as described below. The results of this case study are 
included in this paper for comparison purposes. For conducting the remaining three case studies, we 
recruited one graduate and two undergraduate students of WU Vienna as case subjects to perform the 
case study work as part of their qualification theses, i.e., Bachelor or Diploma theses. The authors of 
the UML extensions acted as supervisors for the corresponding three case studies. To control the 
important confounding factor of experience, we focused on the experience with a mainstream 
modeling language (UML) and experience from education (in particular regarding RBAC concepts). 
We required the students to have successfully passed a course teaching the basics of the UML and a 
second course providing an introduction to computer security topics (including RBAC). Student 
subjects with an assessable level of educational experience provided a practical operationalisation of a 
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basic UML background, as required by RQ1. Due to the time-unbound nature of the case studies and 
resource constraints, we did not consider modeling professionals as research subjects (see Section 4). 
 
For data collection, the students had to perform an in-depth analysis of the documents describing the 
school's processes as well as an analysis of the respective internal and external regulations. Moreover, 
in case of ambiguities, uncertainty, or insufficient documentation, we requested additional information 
and feedback from the school's staff. Given that certain process models did not contain any security 
details specific to a given UML extension, or relevant materials for a detailed security modeling step 
were missing, the process models were excluded from the corresponding case study. In each case 
study, the following steps were performed: 
(1) The respective student got acquainted with one of the UML extensions presented in Section 2.2 
based on the research material and a tutorial by the authors of the extension. 
(2) Next, the student analyzed the process model collection and identified processes to be modeled via 
the modeling extension.  
(3) The student modeled the processes as UML activities applying the respective UML extension. 
(4) In repeated feedback rounds, the supervisor checked the syntactical correctness of the process 
models and discussed possible improvements with the student.  
(5) The student provided revised versions of the process models. 
(6) After the supervisor approved the process models, selected administrative and faculty members of 
the school answered questions to provide additional information, clarify uncertainties, and to confirm 
the correctness of the extended process diagrams modeled in the case study. 
(7) The student produced final model revisions. 
3.2 Interviews 
After all case studies were finished, the authors of this paper evaluated the results of all case studies by 
performing semi-structured interviews with three members of the school, including the head master, 
one teacher, and one member of the administrative staff. This approach was chosen because interviews 
are one of the most important methods supporting case study research (see, e.g., Runeson and Höst, 
2009). For qualitative case studies it is recommended to choose subjects from different parts of the 
organization to involve different roles in the interviews. The interview was carefully designed using 
the guidelines from Hove and Anda (2005). It consisted of five main open-ended questions. Each 
interview varied between 20 and 25 minutes in length. The answers were recorded by using field notes 
which were then subsequently analyzed by the interviewer considering RQ2. Table 1 details the main 
questions asked in the interviews.  The results of the interviews will be discussed in Section 4. 
 
Q1 Do the process models provide added value for the school? If yes, in how far can the school/members of 
the school benefit from the extended process models? 
Q2 How will the extended process models potentially be used in the school? 
Q3 What do you think about our approach of integrating process models and related security aspects? 
Advantages/Disadvantages? 
Q4 Do you have difficulties in understanding different parts of the processes? If yes, which parts are easy to 
understand and which parts are difficult or not comprehensible? 
Q5 Do you have any suggestions on how the graphical representation of the processes can be improved? 
Table 1. Questions from semi-structured interviews 
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4 Results 
We completed four case studies, each focusing on one specific UML extension (duties, delegation, 
context constraints, and break-glass policies, see Section 2). Overall, 23 processes were modeled in the 
four case studies. Each of the case studies modeled a subset of the 30 processes from the process 
collection. These subsets are overlapping, because seven of the 23 modeled processes are included in 
more than one case study. One process was even selected in all four case studies. Each modeler chose 
the subset of processes for his/her case study depending on their suitability to be modeled via the 
corresponding UML extension (see Section 3.1). 
 
Figure 3. Case study length in days (based on 8-hours working days) 
Figure 3 details the estimated periods of time for each phase in the case studies (see Section 3.1 for 
details on each phase). The case studies took between 1.3 days for the pre-test case study on the 
Break-Glass extension and 23.5 days for the Delegation extension. Due to the fact that the Break-
Glass case study was performed by the authors of this UML extension, the resulting amount of time of 
about 1.3 working days approximates the minimum time effort needed for performing the case study, 
if the modeler was already familiar with the corresponding UML extension. 
4.1 Observations 
For each case study, Table 2 lists the number of processes modeled via the respective UML extension, 
the number of different symbols used for the processes in the case study, how many of these symbols 
were taken from the extended symbol set, as well as the number of revisions until the final version of 
the processes was approved. 
 










Duty Extension (Schefer and 
Strembeck, 2011a)  
10 15 9 3 
Delegation Extension (Schefer and 
Strembeck, 2011b, Schefer-Wenzl 
et al., 2012)  
4 16 12 4 
Context constraints Extension 
(Schefer-Wenzl and Strembeck, 
2012a) 
7 12 7 2 
Break-glass Extension (Schefer-
Wenzl and Strembeck, 2012b)  
2 10 6 1 
Table 2. Case study details 
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For example, row 1 in Table 2 shows that the case study on duties involved ten processes exhibiting 
requirements on an explicit duty management to meet certain legal requirements. Therefore, the 10 
processes were modeled using the DutyNodes extension presented in Schefer and Strembeck (2011a). 
Throughout all processes modeled in this case study, 15 different UML symbols were used. Nine of 
these symbols were new symbols introduced by the DutyNodes UML extension. The last column in 
Table 2 indicates the number of revisions (3) that were necessary in order to produce the final version 
of the extended process models, which was approved by both the supervisor and the school center's 
headmaster. 
4.2 Discussion  
To create some background for interpreting the case and interview data in the light of the two research 
questions, we first comment on the characteristics of the resulting process models. For larger process 
models (i.e., of size greater than or equal to 50 nodes), it was empirically established that model 
understandability decreases and defect probability increases (Mendling et al., 2010). Therefore, the 
objective is to limit process models to as few elements as possible or to split larger processes into 
smaller parts (e.g., via structured activities in the UML). In our case studies, the number of tasks 
identified for each process description influenced the model size primarily. The maximum model size 
observed amounts to 50% of the empirical threshold established in Mendling et al. (2010), that is, a 
maximum of 25 nodes for the largest model in our case studies. Similarly, the routing paths per model 
element are comparatively small, with a low connector degree affecting model understandability and 
defect probability positively (Mendling et al., 2010). In fact, the typical node has the minimal degree 
of 2 (e.g., one incoming and one outgoing edge for a typical and minimally connected 
BusinessAction). This very low connector degree is partly explained by the comparatively low number 
of gates (i.e., a median gates count of 2), which have a connector degree higher than 2, used in the 
model. To sum up, the 23 process models can be considered of lower to medium complexity in terms 
of the guidelines established by Mendling et al. (2010). This finding is, in itself, encouraging given the 
complexity and heterogeneity of the input material (process descriptions, legislative text, regulatory 
documents) of the process engineering tasks. 
Regarding RQ1, we found that the main challenge for the students was to understand the underlying 
security concepts to be modeled via the corresponding UML extension rather than applying the 
modeling extensions. For example, before being able to apply the BusinessActivityDelegation 
extension (Schefer and Strembeck, 2011b, Schefer-Wenzl et al., 2012), the respective student had to 
understand the concept of delegation roles in RBAC (see, e.g., Zhang et al., 2003). Besides this 
conceptual entry barrier, the students struggled with specifying valid process control flows in terms of 
standard UML activity semantics. A frequent issue was process flow locks due to unrealized implicit 
joins (Schattkowsky and Foster, 2007). As soon as these two barriers had been overcome, we found 
that the extension syntax was used correctly according to their semantics at the first time of usage. The 
later revisions between supervisors and students were primarily devoted to perfective refactorings of 
the process models. These involved the review and the removal of redundantly modeled tasks as well 
as the simplification of control flow structures (e.g., loops). An important refactoring task was the 
relabelling of several symbols. For example, we identified more significant labels for concrete roles 
and duties. Another focus was that Action labels were turned into a object-verb form (Schattkowsky 
and Foster, 2007). In personal communication, the three students concluded that the UML extensions 
were easy to learn when having a critical knowledge of the UML and were perceived as useful for 
modeling the corresponding security aspects. 
In the semi-structured interviews on RQ2 the 23 process models were presented to the headmaster, one 
teacher, and one member of the school's administrative staff. During the interviews, the five questions 
given in Table 1 were addressed. In particular, two advantages of the visually modeled processes were 
communicated to us: First, the headmaster emphasized that new employees who are not familiar with 
school procedures would now have a comprehensive and easy-to-understand, diagram-based 
documentation of key processes and related security concerns at hand. This would have the potential 
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of facilitating work tasks and communication with other school members during the first weeks after 
joining the school. This potential was mainly attributed to the fact that all processes are now 
documented in a consistent, integrated, homogeneous, and standardized way. This opinion may also 
support the frequently cited conjecture that models employing a process flow metaphor are suitable 
communication instruments for non-technical domain experts (see, e.g., Dumas et al., 2012). In 
addition, before our effort, only a few processes were depicted using an ad hoc (i.e., non-standard) 
visual notation. Most processes were described via textual documents in varying degrees of detail. The 
state of the organization’s process descriptions was therefore inconsistent and inhomogeneous. 
Moreover, and second, the interview partners noted that the security-aware process models would 
improve the general awareness among the school members of how closely security requirements are 
related to key organizational processes. All three members of the school stated that the process models 
are easy to comprehend in their essence (e.g., task and role labels, basic sequencing of tasks, relations 
between duties and tasks). This could have been facilitated by the low to medium model complexity, 
as stated above.  
5 Limitations and Threats 
Case studies: The case study design was aligned to evaluating our modeling framework. As a 
consequence, the study design presents limitations to the generalizability of our findings. An important 
limitation results from the scope of a single organization for the four cases. The observations might 
therefore be specific to the domain of Austrian secondary schooling. However, within this domain, we 
aimed at a broad coverage of domain areas: the process models cover topics ranging from the school's 
process management to the emergency evacuation procedures. Nevertheless, future work must 
investigate whether the findings hold for different branches and different types of organizations. In 
addition, by limiting each case study and each student to applying a single UML extension, the 
findings do not reflect possible interactions between the extensions when used conjointly for a 
modeling task. For example, we might have missed positive effects (e.g., structuring, reuse of one 
extension’s elements for another) or negative effects (e.g., contradicting modeling decisions and 
model defects) on modeling break-glass procedures, duties, and delegation in a single model. 
However, our research design was clearly confined to observing our UML extensions in isolation. 
Besides, there is the risk that the extended time frames, which were available to the students to 
complete their modeling tasks, have introduced a learning effect. Any modeling task completed 
comparatively late during a case study might have been affected by the repeated revisions and 
feedback rounds between supervisors and students (see Table 2). To make the possible learning effects 
explicit, we documented the individual revisions and commented on change patterns in Section 4.2. 
However, granting these time frames allowed us to observe the effects of solving non-trivial modeling 
challenges using the UML extensions, which is otherwise impossible during a controlled experiment. 
Another personal bias could have been introduced by the authors of the UML extensions acting as the 
supervisors of the students working on the cases. The feedback rounds might have caused the 
supervisors to exert a critical influence on the decision-making process of the students who were 
applying the respective extension to solve a task (e.g., by communicating personal preferences towards 
certain modeling options). We tried to limit this influence by flipping the supervisor role for a given 
case study (and a given extension focus) between two extension authors. 
Using graduate and undergraduate students as empirical subjects in the case studies cannot provide 
insights that can be generalized to professional practitioners facing comparable modeling tasks (see, 
e.g., Falessi et al., 2010). Recruiting students has the disadvantage of observing subjects having little 
experience both in process modeling (i.e., UML activity modeling) and in the domain modeled (e.g., 
legal framework for schooling processes). As a result,  we observed erroneous control flows in the 
process models due to the students’ unawareness of certain UML activity specificities. Most 
prominently, the hidden interaction between implicit joins performed by UML actions (see 
Schattkowsky and Foster, 2007) and decision nodes inserted prior to them was neglected repeatedly, 
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leading to deadlocks in the token flows. Even in the last revision, 10 out of the 23 models showed this 
defect. Note, however, that these defects result from the pitfalls of process modeling in general and 
cannot be related to the usage of our UML extensions.  
Interviews: In likewise manner, there are threats to the observations from the three interviews. To 
begin with, they cannot be generalized beyond the narrow educational domain because the interview 
partners are all embedded into a single institution. There is also the risk of an interviewer bias because 
the interviewer is also author of the evaluated UML extensions. This double role might have affected 
the open-ended conversation of the interviews. To minimise this risk, the interviewer, however, tried 
to observe rather than steer the conversation and encouraged the interviewees to talk. 
6 Related Work  
While substantial empirical evidence on general process modeling has been reported (see Mendling et 
al., 2010) for an overview), more specific empirical studies in the field of process-related security 
engineering are rare; not to mention multimethod studies. In the few reports (Mouratidis and Jürjens, 
2006; Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007; Gao et al., 2004; Grünbauer et al., 2003; Schaad and Moffett, 
2004; Giorgini et al., 2003) based on real-world cases, the underlying research designs are often not 
made explicit and the levels of descriptive detail spent on research methods vary significantly. Also, 
empirical instruments such as case studies are used in different design research phases. More 
importantly, however, the term "case study" is often used to denote mere examples of application for 
the documented modeling concepts, without a critical-analytical research objective (e.g., prototype 
improvement) and without guiding research questions (see. e.g., Runeson und Höst, 2009). A notable 
exception is a case study report by Accorsi and Stocker (2012). They describe a case design including 
phases and research questions on whether process-mining techniques as offered by ProM and 
conformance checking can be used to verify security properties (separation of duties, authorization) 
during security audits.  
As for evaluating application cases, Gao et al. (2004) document an aspect-oriented approach for 
engineering access control in software systems by allowing for an extensible realization of the 
RBAC96 model in the UML and AspectJ aspects at the system level. To demonstrate the feasibility of 
their approach, they describe the case of introducing various RBAC levels into object-oriented 
middleware (CORBA Security). As in our setting, the case work is performed at the evaluation phase 
(i.e., the UML extension has been built). However, there are no case design and analysis applied 
beyond the exemplary CORBA application of the UML extension itself. Content-wise, our study 
covers advanced RBAC concerns (duties, context constraints, delegation). Similarly, Mouratidis and 
Giorgini (2007) present an application case from the health care domain (electronic Single Assessment 
Process, eSAP) to illustrate the agent-oriented Secure Tropos/i* modeling approach. In contrast to our 
approach, Secure Tropos/i* also covers the early software development phases (requirement analysis, 
architecture); and so does the case. However, there is no business process viewpoint with formally 
defined security-aware behavioral semantics. The UMLsec framework has been exemplified in two 
application cases: a biometric authentication protocol (Jürjens, 2005) and a point-of-sale transaction 
system (Mouratidis and Jürjens, 2006). UMLsec is centered on security properties of business data 
(confidentiality, integrity) rather than process security in more general. Both cases are not designed 
and reported as empirical case studies. Grünbauer et al. (2003) describe an internet banking case 
(authentication, confidentiality) of applying their CASE-based technique for modeling layered 
cryptographic protocols using state charts. Again, this application case is purely demonstrative and 
does not cover critical security concerns of process flows (RBAC, duties). 
A second class of related work employs demonstrative cases in early design research, for identifying 
requirements of a model-driven security engineering approach, rather than to evaluate it. Giorgini et 
al. (2003) put forth a case on modeling the Secure Electronic Transactions (SET) procedures for credit 
cards. This case motivates the authors to add modeling support for task-goal-permission dependencies 
to Tropos/i*. Another motivating case in the banking domain is given by Schaad and Moffett (2004), 
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looking at the levels of organizational controls during credit application processes. These include 
separation of duties, delegation of obligations, and reviews, which are also considered in our modeling 
extensions. However, their Control Principle modeling framework does not integrate with a process 
flow viewpoint. 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we presented a multi-method study for the evaluation of different UML extensions for 
process-related security properties. The evaluation was conducted on a collection of real-world 
processes from a large Austrian school center. In particular, we systematically report on a set of case 
studies which were conducted in order to test the practical applicability of the respective UML 
extensions. Moreover, we conducted semi-structured interviews to further evaluate the artifacts that 
were produced in the case studies. The results from our multi-method study suggest that the UML 
extensions are suited for the application in real-world business settings. We also identified several 
points of improvement which will be considered in our future work. Moreover, our future work will 
include comprehensive studies to measure aspects such as the cognitive effectiveness of the UML 
extensions (see, e.g., Moody, 2009). In addition, we hope that our multi-method study inspires 
similar empirical research on other model-driven security engineering approaches. 
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